According to the North Carolina Military Business Center’s (NCMBC) Technology Transition Office, the next major opportunity in national security may not be determined by who builds the most sophisticated technology. It may be determined by who can produce useful technology at scale, get it into the hands of military operators, and do it fast enough to matter.

That is the message emerging from the Pentagon's October 2026 discussions at the Association of the United States Army's annual meeting in Washington. Secretary Pete Hegseth and senior military leaders outlined an ambitious effort to change how the military develops, acquires, and fields autonomous systems. The initiative has implications well beyond the traditional defense industry. For North Carolina, it raises an important economic question: Are our technology companies, manufacturers, universities, and workforce positioned to participate in this next phase of national security innovation?

The answer will depend on more than the quality of the technology being developed. It will depend on whether that technology can move from an innovative idea to an operational capability that the military can acquire, produce, maintain, and use.

From Innovation to Operational Capability
On September 30, 2026, Hegseth announced Project Agincourt, an initiative intended to accelerate the development, acquisition, and operational integration of unmanned and autonomous systems. The effort brings military operators, engineers, acquisition officials, and commercial manufacturers closer together so that systems can be tested, improved, and adapted to actual operational needs.

The objective is a fundamental change in how the Pentagon approaches autonomous technology. Rather than relying exclusively on traditional acquisition processes designed around complex, expensive platforms, the initiative emphasizes systems that can be produced at scale, improved quickly, and employed in large numbers.

Hegseth has described the goal as expanding the nation's autonomous arsenal from thousands of units to millions. That is not simply a procurement target. It represents a different industrial challenge.

Producing a handful of sophisticated prototypes requires one set of capabilities. Manufacturing thousands or millions of reliable systems, maintaining quality, securing supply chains, managing costs, and incorporating feedback from operators requires an entirely different level of industrial capacity.

The opportunity therefore extends beyond companies that design drones or develop artificial intelligence. It includes manufacturers, component suppliers, software developers, sensor companies, electronics producers, logistics providers, and organizations capable of integrating multiple technologies into a functioning system.

For North Carolina businesses, the question is not whether they can build a drone. It is whether they possess a technology, manufacturing capability, or specialized service that solves a problem the military needs to address - and whether they can deliver it at the required scale.

The Pentagon Is Changing More Than Its Technology
Project Agincourt is part of a broader effort to change the organizational structure behind autonomous warfare. The Pentagon is pursuing the establishment of a new four-star joint command, the Autonomous Warfare Command, with an implementation target of October 1, 2027, subject to congressional authorization.

The proposed command is intended to consolidate authority, resources, and acquisition capabilities that have historically been distributed across military services. The Army is also moving to establish its own Futures and Autonomous Systems Command, reflecting the urgency with which the services are approaching this challenge.

The significance of these changes is easy to overlook. New technology alone does not necessarily change military capability. Technology must pass through a system of requirements, experimentation, acquisition, contracting, production, training, and operational integration.

When those activities are disconnected, promising solutions can spend years navigating institutional boundaries. By the time they reach the field, the original problem may have changed, the technology may have advanced, or the operational need may have become more urgent.

Project Agincourt is intended to shorten that distance between the people who understand the problem and the people who can solve it.

The initiative also places greater emphasis on direct collaboration between military operators and commercial innovators. Under its leadership structure, Owen West serves as chief executive officer, bringing experience in military service, defense innovation, and private capital. Max Strasiser, an active-duty Navy SEAL senior chief, serves as chief operating officer, bringing an operational perspective to the integration of new systems.

The underlying principle is straightforward: Technology should be evaluated not only by what it can do in a demonstration, but by whether it works for the people expected to use it under operational conditions.

For companies seeking government customers, that distinction matters. A technically impressive product is not automatically a military capability. The path to adoption requires a clear understanding of the operational problem, evidence that the solution addresses it, and a credible plan for getting it into use.

Scale Is the New Industrial Challenge
The funding proposals accompanying this effort underscore the scale of the ambition. The Pentagon is seeking $50 billion in reconciliation funding to support drone and robotic production through Project Agincourt and the proposed Autonomous Warfare Command. The fiscal 2027 budget proposal also includes a $53.6 billion Drone Dominance request, with funding for unmanned systems procurement, counter-drone networks, and contested logistics.

These figures represent requested funding, not a guarantee that every proposed dollar will be appropriated or spent as planned. Nevertheless, they signal the direction in which national security priorities are moving.

The systems involved extend across multiple operating environments. They include unmanned aircraft, collaborative combat aircraft designed to operate alongside piloted fighters, intelligence and surveillance platforms, uncrewed naval systems, ground robots, and other autonomous capabilities.

The scale of this demand creates a challenge that cannot be solved by research and development alone. Companies must be able to move from prototype to production. Components must be available. Manufacturing processes must be repeatable. Systems must be supportable, and suppliers must be capable of meeting delivery requirements.

This is where the economic opportunity becomes especially relevant to North Carolina.

North Carolina has a combination of military installations, defense-related businesses, research institutions, engineering talent, and manufacturing capacity. Those assets create a foundation for participation in the national security technology market. But having the assets is not the same as connecting them to the opportunities.

The companies most likely to benefit will be those that understand where their capabilities fit within the emerging requirements and can demonstrate that they are ready to deliver.

North Carolina's Opportunity Is the Transition Gap
One of the persistent challenges in national security innovation is the gap between developing a promising technology and transitioning it into operational use.

A company may develop a useful sensor, autonomous platform, advanced material, or software application without knowing which military organization needs it, who has the authority to evaluate it, how it can be acquired, or what evidence is required to move it beyond a demonstration.

Meanwhile, military organizations may have urgent operational problems but limited visibility into the commercial technologies that could address them.

The result is a familiar problem: Innovation exists, demand exists, but the two do not always connect in a way that produces an operational capability.

Project Agincourt's emphasis on bringing operators, engineers, acquisition personnel, and manufacturers together is an attempt to address that disconnect. It also reinforces the importance of organizations that can help companies navigate the transition process.

For North Carolina, this is an area where the NCMBC and its Technology Transition Office can play a practical role.

The opportunity is not simply to encourage more companies to enter the defense market or to organize more innovation events. It is to help qualified companies understand the operational problems being addressed, identify the organizations responsible for those problems, navigate acquisition and contracting pathways, and develop a realistic plan for transitioning their technologies into use.

That work begins by understanding demand.

A company does not need to develop an entirely new autonomous platform to contribute. It may possess a component, manufacturing process, software capability, sensor, or integration expertise that makes an existing system more effective or easier to produce. The challenge is identifying where that capability meets a real requirement and establishing a credible path to adoption.

This is particularly important for small and midsize businesses. They may have technologies that larger defense contractors need, but lack the relationships, acquisition knowledge, or resources to navigate the federal market independently.

Connecting those businesses to the right technical, operational, and acquisition partners can help North Carolina capture more of the economic value associated with national security investment.

The Difference Between Participating and Winning
The growing emphasis on autonomous systems will attract companies that see a large potential market. But anticipated spending should not be confused with guaranteed business.

Funding proposals must move through the federal budget process. Acquisition strategies will continue to evolve. Competition will be substantial, and the military's requirements will favor solutions that demonstrate operational value rather than novelty alone.

Businesses entering this market should begin with a different question than, "How can we sell our technology to the military?"

They should ask, "What problem can we solve that matters to the military, and what would it take to prove that our solution works?"

That question changes the business strategy.

It directs attention toward the end user, the operational environment, the performance requirements, the acquisition organization, and the production model. It also encourages companies to identify potential partners before committing significant resources to a product that may not align with a military requirement.

For North Carolina's innovation ecosystem, the priority should be to build stronger connections among military demand, commercial technology, acquisition pathways, and industrial capacity. Research institutions can contribute discoveries. Businesses can develop and manufacture solutions. Military organizations can define problems and evaluate capabilities. Transition organizations can help connect those elements into a process that produces results.

No single organization can accomplish that alone.

The Larger Economic Question
The Pentagon's autonomous systems initiative is ultimately about more than drones. It reflects a broader recognition that technological advantage depends on the ability to translate innovation into usable capability at the speed and scale demanded by national security.

For North Carolina, the opportunity is to become more effective at that translation.

The state does not need to develop every technology or manufacture every system. It needs to identify where its existing capabilities can contribute, help businesses connect with genuine military demand, and reduce the friction that prevents promising technologies from reaching operational users.

That requires a shift in perspective. Innovation should not be measured solely by the number of new technologies developed, companies formed, or demonstrations conducted. Those are useful indicators of activity, but they do not establish whether a technology has been adopted, whether a military problem has been solved, or whether lasting economic value has been created.

The more consequential measures are whether technologies transition into operational use, whether companies secure sustainable production opportunities, and whether the resulting activity strengthens the state's industrial base and workforce.

Project Agincourt is still an evolving initiative, and its ultimate effects will depend on funding, implementation, and the military's ability to execute the proposed reforms. But its direction presents a clear challenge to the national security innovation community.

The next opportunity will not necessarily go to the company with the most interesting technology. It will go to the companies that can connect their capabilities to real operational needs and deliver solutions that work.

North Carolina has many of the ingredients needed to participate. The task now is to connect them—and turn innovation into capability, and capability into economic opportunity.

 For more information or to contact the NCMBC, contact TJ Gilroy at gilroyt@ncmbc.us or visit us online at www.ncmbc.us.